Moral Dilemma for Naturalism

 Moral Dilemma for Naturalism

In a previous posts here and here, I showed that God is the best ground for moral imperatives and I give some framework of what I believe is our moral imperatives. 

In this post, I will attempt to firm up my claim theism is the best explanation and in particularly why naturalism fails.

Discussion. 

Typically the Euthyphro Dilemma is a key argument against theists claim to moral truths, the objection goes:

Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good?

Essentially creating two horns of a dilemma. 

The first Horn:

Is it good because God commands it? This essentially makes moral facts arbitrary to God, meaning it could be that if God changed what he commands what is good, we could be commanded to murder and it would be good.

The second Horn:

Does God command it because it's good? Meaning God is describing some other necessary moral fact outside of Himself.

The point being, both options are unpalatable to theists as both diminish God's commands or His nature. 

Third option?

The solution is, to show that the dilemma is false and we show a possible third option. Namely, God is the good, meaning God neither arbitrarily commands nor describe an Independent good, He just is the good. In other words and specifically, God's great making properties (omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence), necessarily means God knows all truth claims, including moral claims, and his omnipotence means he has the power to bring about any state of affairs and the power to bind our moral imperatives to oughts we have to act on.

Additionally, in my previous post, I showed that God doesn’t have obligations but he knows what beings like us need to flourish and sets our obligations as such.

So, it seems at least on this point and my argumention in my previous posts, show theism has a robust answer to moral obligations, duties and imperatives. 

What about naturalism? 

Naturalisms Dilemma

The Euthyphro Dilemma for Naturalism.

“Are moral values and duties good because they are grounded in natural facts, or are they grounded in natural facts because they are good?”

First Horn: Moral Values Are Arbitrarily Grounded in Natural Facts

If natural facts (such as evolutionary fitness, survival, or well-being) define moral goodness, morality becomes arbitrary.

Why these facts rather than others?

For example, why prioritize human flourishing over the flourishing of bacteria, ecosystems, or nothingness?

Without a transcendent standard, there’s no objective reason to favor one set of natural facts over another, reducing moral values to human preferences or cultural conventions.

Second Horn: Natural Facts Are Good Because of an Independent Standard

If moral values are grounded in something beyond natural facts, then naturalism fails to explain morality altogether.

It raises the question: what determines that these particular natural facts are morally significant?

For example, even if evolution produces empathy and cooperation, why ought we to value these traits?

In this case, naturalists must either posit a transcendent moral standard which undermines strict naturalism or accept that their worldview lacks a grounding for objective moral truths.

To be clear, the majority of sophisticated atheists accept this and know it's a well understood problem, for which they have a number of different solutions to answer the question. The point was to show to the more dogmatic Dawkins, Dennett, Harris or Hitchens types, that it isn't only a problem for theism.

Hume's Observation

Hume noted that moral arguments often involve a subtle shift in reasoning: they begin with premises about how the world is (descriptive statements) and conclude with a statement about how the world ought to be (prescriptive statements). However, there is no logical connection that justifies this leap unless an additional bridging principle is introduced.

For example:

1. Descriptive: People generally want to live in harmonious societies.

2. Prescriptive: Therefore, we ought to act in ways that promote harmony.

Hume pointed out that the transition from the descriptive fact "people want harmony" to the prescriptive conclusion "we ought to promote it" is not self-evident. Something more must be added like a moral principle stating that what people want is morally good.

Naturalistic explanations

Naturalists have proposed several ways to bridge the is-ought gap and ground moral obligations within a naturalistic framework. While these approaches aim to reconcile the descriptive facts of the natural world with prescriptive moral duties, each comes with its strengths and limitations. Here are some prominent naturalistic attempts:

1. Moral Realism

Moral realism holds that moral facts exist objectively and are part of the natural world, as abstract metaphysical truths.

Approach: Moral facts are discovered, not created, and they exist independently of human minds. For example, "causing unnecessary suffering is wrong" could be a brute fact about the universe.

Criticism:

It doesn't explain why these moral facts carry normative force. In other words, Why ought we care about or follow them? And more importantly what makes them binding for individuals to follow?

Moral Realism is probably the most plausible on naturalism, but it just describes "is's" not prescriptive "oughts".

The existence of objective moral facts in a purely material universe is often seen as metaphysically puzzling or counterintuitive.

2. Evolutionary Ethics

This approach argues that moral intuitions and behaviors evolved because they conferred survival and reproductive advantages.

Approach: Moral "oughts" are derived from what has helped humans survive and thrive as a species. For instance, cooperation and altruism promote group survival, which explains why we value them.

Criticism:

Evolution describes why we do behave in certain ways, not why we ought to. Just because evolution shaped our instincts doesn’t mean those instincts are morally binding (e.g., natural selection also favors selfishness and violence in certain contexts).

The "naturalistic fallacy": Conflating what is "natural" with what is "good."

A more troubling implications is that had evolution been different, our morals could have evolved differently and our moral intuitions could be completely different, making the idea of "oughts" meaningless. 

3. Constructivism

Constructivists argue that moral truths are not objective but are constructed through rational deliberation or social agreement.

Approach: Moral "oughts" emerge from shared human values, societal needs, or rational consensus. For example, we agree on the wrongness of theft because it destabilizes society.

Criticism:

If morality is constructed, it risks being arbitrary or relativistic. Why should someone accept the social consensus if it conflicts with their personal goals?

Constructivism struggles to provide universal moral norms, as different societies or individuals may construct conflicting moral systems.

Additionally, it fails the is-ought challenge, as it merely describes what "is", not what we ought to do.

4. Utilitarianism/Consequentialism

Utilitarianism claims that moral "oughts" are grounded in facts about well-being, pleasure, or happiness.

Approach: "We ought to maximize happiness and minimize suffering because happiness is inherently good." The descriptive fact that humans seek happiness becomes the basis for moral obligations.

Criticism:

Why should one prioritize overall happiness, especially when it conflicts with personal interests or desires?

It assumes that happiness is the ultimate moral goal without justifying why it ought to be. More troubling, it faces the additional conundrum of paradoxes like the pin prick analogy: If happiness and flourishing is to be preferred, we can imagine an individual that's life is in pain, but their life is otherwise, worth living, but it could be the addition of a single pin prick that the individuals life is now suffering too much and they should or they would be justified in killing themselves. 

There are other analogies that are similar for destroying the world, which similarly shows the counterintuitive nature of utilitarianism.

The is-ought leap remains unaddressed unless you accept the normative principle that "happiness is good" and even then it is just describing what "is, not what you ought to do.

5. Ethical Naturalism

Ethical naturalists argue that moral properties (like "goodness") can be reduced to natural properties (like well-being or flourishing).

Approach: Moral "oughts" are derived from facts about human nature and flourishing. For example, "Humans flourish in communities, so we ought to act in ways that promote communal well-being."

Criticism:

Reducing moral properties to natural properties often leads to disputes about what counts as "flourishing" or "well-being." 

It may still smuggle in unexamined normative assumptions, such as "flourishing is good." 

Even if we accept flourishing is good, that isn't equivalent to moral; it's good to be a doctor, but you aren't necessarily moral simply because you are a doctor, similarly pleasure might be broadly "good", but you're not necessarily moral by being in a state of pleasure, and conversely, being bored isn't immoral. Flourishing and well-being therefore, are not equivalents to moral duties or imperatives. 

And even then, it would just be describing what is, not what we ought to do.

6. Desire-Based Theories

Some naturalists ground morality in the desires or preferences of individuals or groups.

Approach: "We ought to do X because it fulfills a fundamental human desire or preference." For example, if people desire peace, they ought to act in ways that promote peace.

Criticism:

Desires are subjective and can conflict, so it's unclear why fulfilling one desire (e.g., peace) should outweigh another (e.g., revenge).

Not all desires are morally good—some may lead to harm or injustice.

But even granting this dubious claim, it would just describe, not prescribe what we ought to do.

7. Pragmatism

Pragmatists ground morality in what "works" for individuals or societies.

Approach: Moral norms are justified based on their practical outcomes, such as fostering cooperation or reducing conflict. "We ought to follow rules that lead to the best outcomes for society."

Criticism:

Pragmatism often reduces morality to expediency, which risks undermining moral principles when they become inconvenient.

It struggles to address why someone should act morally when it doesn’t align with their personal interests.

Even if we accept this is good, that just describes what is, not what what we ought to do.

8. Humanism

Humanists ground morality in the intrinsic value of human beings and their capacity for reason, empathy, and flourishing.

Approach: "We ought to act morally because doing so respects the dignity and worth of all humans."

Criticism:

The assumption of intrinsic human value is difficult to justify on naturalistic grounds. Why do humans (or any beings) have intrinsic worth in a purposeless, indifferent universe?

It risks being circular: "Humans are valuable because we value humans." Moreover, it is speciesism to prefer our flourishing, why nott other kinds of flourishing? 

And again it fails to bridge the is-ought gap.

9. Emergent Moral Properties

Some argue that moral "oughts" are emergent properties of complex systems, such as human societies or consciousness.

Approach: Moral obligations "emerge" from interactions within social systems, much like consciousness emerges from neural activity. For instance, societal stability gives rise to the norm "we ought to respect others."

Criticism:

Emergent properties don’t explain why they are prescriptive. Why ought someone respect emergent norms if they disagree or find them inconvenient?

It may fail to provide objective grounding, as emergent properties are contingent on human contexts.

Summary of Challenges

While naturalistic approaches to bridging the is-ought gap can be creative and compelling in certain respects, they often struggle to:

Provide a clear, non-arbitrary basis for normativity.

Explain why moral obligations are binding on all rational agents.

Avoid reducing morality to relativism, subjectivism, or mere description.

These challenges lead many to conclude that naturalism lacks the resources to fully bridge the gap, while others continue to refine these theories

Other Options?

Non-Cognitive approaches:

Non-cognitivist theories are those that deny moral statements of truth, or more accurately they are incapable of being true or false:

1. Emotivism 

Moral statements do not express propositions (statements that can be true or false) but instead express emotions or attitudes. It is sometimes summarized as the "boo-hurrah" theory of ethics.

Example:

Saying "Stealing is wrong" is equivalent to saying, "Boo to stealing!"

Saying "Helping the poor is good" is equivalent to saying, "Hurrah for helping the poor!"

Appeal:

Alignment with Logical Positivism:

Emotivism arose in the context of logical positivism, which held that meaningful statements must be empirically verifiable or analytically true. Since moral claims are neither, emotivists categorized them as expressions of emotion rather than factual assertions.

Explanation of Disagreement:

Accounts for why moral debates often seem intractable. Since moral claims express emotions rather than objective facts, disagreements are more like clashing preferences than factual disputes.

Psychological Insight:

It captures the intuitive sense that moral language often conveys strong emotional reactions (e.g., disgust, approval) rather than purely descriptive content.

Criticism:

Fails to Account for Moral Reasoning:

Moral discussions often involve reasoning and appeal to facts or principles, suggesting more than mere emotional expression. For example, debates about justice or human rights seem to presuppose objective standards, not just emotional reactions.

Moral Language Seems Cognitive:

People typically use moral statements as though they are truth-apt (i.e., capable of being true or false). For example, "Murder is wrong" feels like a claim about reality, not just an emotional outburst.

Moral Motivation Is More Complex:

Emotivism oversimplifies moral motivation. While emotions play a role, moral judgments often involve reasoned reflection and commitment to principles, which emotivism struggles to explain.

Intersubjective Agreement:

Emotivism cannot explain why people often reach consensus on moral issues. If morality were purely emotional, agreement would be as rare as universal agreement on tastes in music or art.

No Normative Force:

Emotivism offers no account of why anyone ought to act morally. If moral claims merely express feelings, there’s no compelling reason to follow them. 

2. Prescriptivism

Moral statements are not expressions of emotion but prescriptions or imperatives.

Example: "Lying is wrong" means "Do not lie" and implies a command that applies universally.

Prescriptivism also emphasizes consistency; you cannot prescribe a rule for others without being willing to apply it to yourself.

Appeal:

Attempts to incorporate rationality and universality into moral discourse.

Avoids the subjectivism criticism leveled at emotivism because it emphasizes consistency in moral prescriptions.

Criticism:

While prescriptivism explains moral language, it struggles to explain why anyone ought to follow prescriptions, especially when they conflict with personal desires.

Reduces morality to a kind of linguistic exercise, leaving normativity unexplained.

3. Expressivism

Builds on emotivism by suggesting moral statements express attitudes or commitments rather than just emotions.

Example: "Lying is wrong" expresses disapproval of lying and a commitment to avoiding it.

Focuses on the social function of moral discourse, such as coordinating actions and resolving conflicts.

Appeal:

More sophisticated than emotivism, as it accounts for the complex roles of moral language, such as guiding behavior and fostering shared values.

Avoids the "boo-hurrah" oversimplification of emotivism.

Criticism:

Like emotivism, it struggles to account for the normative force of moral claims.

Critics argue that expressivism collapses into subjectivism because it makes moral truth dependent on individual or group attitudes.

4. Quasi-Realism

Attempts to explain why moral discourse seems objective while maintaining a non-cognitivist foundation.

Example: Even if "lying is wrong" is not objectively true, we treat it as though it is because this helps coordinate actions and sustain moral practices.

Moral objectivity is seen as a useful fiction rather than a metaphysical reality.

Appeal:

Provides a way for non-cognitivists to engage with moral realism without committing to objective moral facts.

Retains the practical benefits of moral discourse.

Criticism:

Critics argue it blurs the line between realism and anti-realism, making it difficult to distinguish quasi-realism from outright moral realism.

It also fails to resolve the is-ought gap because it ultimately reduces moral truths to pragmatic tools.

5. Moral Fictionalism

Suggests that while moral claims are not true, we should treat them as if they are for practical purposes.

Example: "Lying is wrong" is a useful fiction that helps maintain social order.

Appeal:

Provides a pragmatic solution to the collapse of objective morality under non-cognitivism or error theory.

Preserves the utility of moral discourse without requiring belief in moral facts.

Criticism:

Critics argue it is intellectually dishonest to knowingly engage in moral discourse while denying its truth.

It leaves morality feeling hollow, as it becomes a social construct with no intrinsic binding force.

Appeal of Non-Cognitivist Theories

The primary appeal of non-cognitivist theories often lies in their ability to sidestep the is-ought gap. Since they do not claim that moral statements are true or false, they avoid the challenge of deriving normative "oughts" from descriptive "is" statements. However, this avoidance comes at a cost:

Risk of Subjectivism:

Non-cognitivist theories are often accused of collapsing into subjectivism or relativism because they tie moral claims to individual or group attitudes, emotions, or commitments.

Loss of Normativity:

If moral statements are neither true or false, it's unclear why anyone ought to follow them. Non-cognitivist theories struggle to explain the binding nature of moral obligations.

Practicality Without Objectivity:

Theories like expressivism and quasi-realism attempt to retain the practical aspects of moral discourse while denying its objective truth. Critics argue this undermines the seriousness of moral claims.

Naturalism fails to address moral imperatives. 

We can see naturalism fails to adequately explain why we have moral duties / imperatives and more importantly why we "ought" to do them.

Theism's Coherence: Why Theism is the Best Explanation for Morals

Theism is More Expected as a Moral Framework

One reason to prefer theism over naturalism is that moral agency and objective morality are more expected on theism. My version of Paul Draper's argument for moral agency (here) demonstrates that theism provides a robust framework where moral facts, agents, and duties align with the nature of a maximally great being (MGB).

Theism Provides a Sufficient Bridge to the Is-Ought Problem

Naturalistic frameworks famously struggle with bridging the is-ought gap explaining how descriptive facts about the world can give rise to prescriptive moral obligations. In contrast, theism offers a coherent solution grounded in the nature of a maximally great being.

A maximally great being, by definition, exists necessarily and possesses omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. This means:

Omnipotence: The ability to actualise any logically possible state of affairs.

Omniscience: Complete knowledge of all truths, including moral truths.

Omnibenevolence: Perfect moral goodness.

Such a being must be morally perfect because any deviation from moral perfection would entail acting contrary to its omniscient understanding of moral truths and logically possible goods. This contradiction would disqualify it from being maximally great.  For slightly more detailed explanation look here.

More importantly, such a being would know what obligations beings like ourselves would be for our flourishing.

God as the Ground of the Is-Ought Problem

A maximally great being provides the necessary foundation for moral laws by:

Instantiating moral laws: These laws are designed for human flourishing and aim at the greatest good for those who follow them.

Embedding moral truths in our nature: These truths are given as properly basic beliefs, meaning they are self-evident and do not require further justification.

Because God’s nature is the source of these moral laws, they are necessarily binding and objective. Unlike naturalistic explanations, which often reduce moral imperatives to subjective or evolutionary constructs, theism offers a grounding that is both universal and authoritative.

Conclusion

Naturalism fails to provide a satisfactory account of morality, leaving questions like the is-ought problem unanswered. Theism, by contrast, demonstrates superior explanatory power. It not only accounts for the existence of moral truths but also grounds them in the nature of a maximally great being.

This coherence makes theism a far more plausible and comprehensive framework for understanding morality.