Draper's Moral Argument for Theism

Paul Draper is an atheist philosopher. But despite the fact that he’s an atheist, he still thinks there is some evidence for God. In particular, he has come up with a moral argument for God’s existence (i.e. an inductive argument). (1)

The argument runs as follows: (2)

1. There are moral agents in the world, i.e., us. By “moral agents,” Draper means that humans have a code of morality and can freely make moral choices.

2. A naturalistic theory of our origins is less likely to explain our status as moral agents than is the existence of God, who made us moral agents.

3. Moral agency requires moral responsibility.

4. To be morally responsible, one must have libertarian free will, that is, at any time one must be able to choose between moral actions and immoral or neutral ones.

5. Such libertarian free will is much more likely to exist under theism than under naturalism.

6. Therefore, moral agency is a strong argument for God.

Defence of the premises:

1. There are moral agents in the world, i.e., us. By “moral agents,” :

This seems trivially true, whether naturalist or theist. It is undeniable that we have some obligations that we 'ought' to do, it is objectively wrong to torture for fun a child, it is wrong to rape, are universal morals we all share.

2. A naturalistic theory of our origins is less likely to explain our status as moral agents than is the existence of God, who made us moral agents:

If naturalism is true, the universe, all life, including subjective first person subjective experiences are explainable by undirected mechanisms. 

I will grant for the purposes of this argument naturalism explains the universe and the origins of first life (though it isn't at all clear it can).

Having granted this concession, on naturalism, the best explanation for the complexity and diversity of life is natural selection via evolution and survival of the fittest. 

Natural selection via survival of the fittest, selects for survival, not necessarily for truth content. E.g. a hypothetical species could develop false beliefs that still infer a survival benefit, for example the animal that runs when it sees a shadow might survive regardless if the shadow is a predator or not.

I will additionally grant that natural selection will on average allow some truth tracking to aid in it's survival, like finding food, selecting mates and some basic reasoning skills akin to the lower animals.

Abilities beyond survival needs, like higher cognitive faculties like abstract reasoning, language, the ability to comprehend the world, like quantum mechanics or space travel are unexpected on naturalism. Or in other words, they are surplus to the requirements of survival. 

Moral truths are abstract concepts and thus, aren't necessarily a survival advantage to select for. In fact, moral constraints could be a distinct disadvantage. See Jane Goodalls work and others on the often brutal ways in which chimpanzees act towards each other, even when they used to be in the same tribes (3)(4)(5)(6)(7). 

Co-operation is only useful once a species has become sophisticated enough to warrant such a relationship, this can only be achieved if the species has the higher cognitive abilities listed above, which are unexplainable on naturalism. If on natural selection it is only expected that a species should have the abilities of that of the apes, our morals should be like those, I.e. brutal behaviors. This doesn't align well with our human evolution, or our moral intuitions. 

If evolution had played out differently, our morals could be vastly different, this is trivially true. Which means on naturalism, the proponent of this worldview, must accept moral facts are not objective. At least it is unexpected on naturalism; I grant it is possible, at least it isn't metaphysically impossible morals are brute facts. But it is inexplicable what makes such a brute fact an ought, or what compels us to act in compliance to these oughts on naturalism. 

3. Moral agency requires moral responsibility:

This again is plausibly true and doesn't need further explanation. 

4. To be morally responsible, one must have libertarian free will, that is, at any time one must be able to choose between moral actions and immoral or neutral ones:

If naturalism is true, it is more expected we are 'determined' to act due to physical laws, which are inherently deterministic and can ultimately become reducable to brain states. 

Although, I grant naturalism doesn't necessarily entail determinism, this is in fact more expected on naturalism than any other hypothesis, which renders free choice impossible and we are not responsible for our actions. 

For genuine free will to exist, agents must have the ability to do otherwise and have true accountability, which isn't available on naturalism as I've described. 

What about other naturalistic accounts?

Compatibilism:

Compatibilism entails and maintains free will and determinism are true. This keeps genuine accountability, while maintaining a deterministic understanding of the universe. 

Freewill redefined:

Compatibilists redefine free will as the ability to act according to one’s desires, motives, or reasons without external constraints.

Freedom is not about the absence of causal determination but about acting voluntarily, in line with one's own brain states.

Moral Responsibility:

Compatibilists argue that moral responsibility arises if an individual’s actions are the result of their own beliefs, desires, and intentions, even if these are determined by prior causes.

Coercion or external compulsion is what negates responsibility, not causal determinism itself.

Strengths of Compatibilism

Compatibilism allows for a scientifically deterministic universe while preserving notions of moral responsibility and accountability.

It avoids the metaphysical challenges of libertarianism by rejecting the need for indeterminism.

Practical Intuition:

Many everyday judgments of moral responsibility focus on whether a person acted voluntarily, not whether their actions were ultimately determined.

Why Compatibilism Fails to Explain Free Will:

Despite its appeal, compatibilism faces significant philosophical challenges, especially when evaluated against the concept of libertarian free will.

Libertarian critics argue that compatibilism’s version of free will is a semantic sleight of hand.

By defining free will as acting on desires and motives, compatibilists avoid the deeper issue of whether one could have acted differently. For true free will to exist, a person must have genuine alternative possibilities for action, not just the appearance of choice.

Determinism Undermines Responsibility:

If determinism is true, then every action is the inevitable result of prior causes, stretching back to events beyond an individual’s control (e.g., genetics, upbringing, and environmental factors). This "causal chain" leads to the conclusion that people are not the ultimate authors of their actions, undermining true moral responsibility.

Even if someone’s actions align with their desires, those desires themselves are determined by factors outside their control, making the individual a "puppet" of deterministic processes.

Illusion of Control:

Compatibilism cannot explain the subjective experience of choosing freely. Humans intuitively feel they are more than mere responders to deterministic causes; they sense they have control over their choices in a way that transcends physical causation.

Failure to Address the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP):

The PAP states that moral responsibility requires the ability to have done otherwise. Compatibilists reject this principle, claiming that an agent can be morally responsible as long as their action stems from their internal motivations.

Critics argue that without genuine alternative possibilities, the sense of responsibility becomes hollow. If a person couldn’t have done otherwise, how can they truly be held accountable?

Challenges from Manipulation Arguments:

Philosophers like Peter van Inwagen and Derk Pereboom present thought experiments to challenge compatibilism. For example:

Imagine a person whose desires and beliefs are implanted by a manipulative neuroscientist. Even if the person acts on those desires, we would not consider them free or responsible because the source of their actions is external.

Determinism, critics argue, functions like such manipulation on a grand scale it removes ultimate authorship.

Incompatibility with Moral Realism:

If compatibilism is true and all actions are determined, it’s difficult to justify objective moral duties. On a deterministic framework, moral "oughts" reduce to descriptions of causally determined behavior, which undermines their normative force.

Why Libertarian Free Will Is More Intuitive:

Libertarian free will holds that, at any given moment, an agent has the real ability to choose alternative courses of action, preserving the intuition of genuine choice.

If we are truly free, then we can be rightly held accountable for our actions. Libertarian free will aligns better with our deeply ingrained moral intuitions.

The libertarian view resonates with the everyday experience of making choices, struggling with moral dilemmas, and holding oneself accountable for decisions.

5. Such libertarian free will is much more likely to exist under theism than under naturalism:

This follows from (4), 

6. Therefore, moral agency is a strong argument for God:

This follows necessarily from 1-5

Notice what the conclusion points out; moral agency is more expected on theism rather than naturalism. Not that this proves theism is true in and of itself,  but is part of an accumulative case, which is an evidential chip in favour of theism.

Conclusion:

Obviously, the topic is more complex than I can give justice to on this blog, but I've distilled the topic the best and as complex as I can.

I have shown that naturalism faces significant challenges in explaining moral agency and our moral intuitions. By contrast, theism offers a coherent and expected foundation for these phenomena. While this argument does not stand alone as proof of theism, it strongly contributes to a cumulative case, making moral agency an evidential chip in favour of theism.

References: 

(1) Draper P, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 311-321 https://www.jstor.org/stable/20010171.

(2) https://jonathandavidgarner.wordpress.com/2017/09/18/paul-drapers-moral-argument-for-the-existence-of-god/

(3)   Goodall, J. 1990, Through a window: My thirty years with the chimpanzees of Gombe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 

(4)   Finch, G. 1943, “The bodily strength of chimpanzees.” Journal of Mammalogy, 24, 224-228. 

(5)   Goodall, J. 1972, In the shadow of man. New York: Dell. 

(6)   Wilson, M.L. et al. 2014, “Lethal aggression in Pan is better explained by adaptive strategies than human impacts.” Nature, 513, 414-417.

(7)   Goodall, J. 1990, Through a window: My thirty years with the chimpanzees of Gombe. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, pp. 128–129.