Micah Ministries

An often used argument from some atheists, is that the typical theist understanding of God, who is omnipotent and omniscient leads to a contradiction where (according to their logic) God knows what any person will do, leading to them being determined. This is where the apparent contradiction comes, if they are determined, God is damning people to hell, for things He, appointed (determined) them to do, making God unjust, that is not omnibenevolent.  Clarifying terms. Before we continue, we should address what we mean by omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence and freewill.  Omniscience: Knowing all true facts including moral truths.  Omnipotence: The ability to do anything logically possible . Omnibenevolence: Being morally perfect. Freewill: Being able to do otherwise, or having significant freedom.  Addressing the issue.  The fact no clear contradiction has been found in philosophical thought and even philosophically sophisticated atheists like Graham Oppy ...

 In my rebuttal of Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness argument  I show that:  1. His ultimism doesn't logically entail perfect love. 2. That general (natural theology) and special (the evidence for Jesus Christ) revelation are sufficient for a belief in God. 3. Temporary hiddenness is compatible even within Schellenberg’s framework and only perpetual hiddenness is incompatible with God. My contention in this post is to suggest that the claim, no God exists or it is unlikely God exists, better known as atheism is incompatible with the claim they are a non-resistant non-believer (NRNB). A NRNB is Schellenberg’s notion for those who would believe, had they sufficient evidence to believe such a proposition. He (Schellenberg) gives numerous cases of apparent NRN-Belief; such as those who never even heard of Jesus or a personal God, say for instance 10,000 years ago, or individuals that are truly seeking, yet for no lack of trying, do not believe. I do not want to go over the sam...

I became a Christian, or rather 'born again,' at age 12 when my dear sister spoke to me in my bedroom, and I made the confession of faith, giving my life to Christ. I felt a joy that I couldn’t express, and colours seemed more vivid and real than ever before. A few years afterward, I was baptised and, like many, experienced my metaphorical '40 days and nights in the desert,' where Jesus faced temptation by the devil. In my case, this seemed to last about two and a half years. I had depression, or more accurately, I had depressive thoughts and deep doubts about my faith. At that point, I didn’t want God to exist and actively sought reasons to disprove His existence. I think we all have an innate sense that we are good people, comparing ourselves to others and saying we’re not like ‘so-and-so’ (whose faults seem worse than ours). Or we say we may not be like Mother Teresa, but we’re nowhere near as bad as Hitler or Tony Blair. In other words, my point is that we tend to j...

I aim to critique Benjamin Blake Speed Watkins 'Argument from General Evil', he posts a formal argument here   What is the Logical Problem of Evil? The logical problem of evil argues that the existence of evil in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of a God who possesses the following attributes: • Omnipotence : God can do anything that is logically possible. • Omniscience : God knows everything, including all future events. • Omnibenevolence : God is perfectly good and desires to prevent all evil unless there’s a morally sufficient reason to allow it. The core claim is that if God has these attributes, evil should not exist. The presence of evil, therefore, seems to contradict the existence of such a God. The argument is often formalised as follows [1]: 1. God is omnipotent (able to prevent all evil). 2. God is omniscient (knows how to prevent all evil). 3. God is omnibenevolent (desires to prevent all evil). 4. Evil exists. If (1), (2), and (3) a...

In some debates atheists insist that God could do 'X' as it contains no logical contradiction. If for example, the atheist insists that a world where free creatures always choose the good is possible, therefore, actualisable. The point being, the concept, contains no clear contradictions at first glance, so if God exists, He should have instantiated it in the actual world, as God by definition has omnipotence, so He has the power to instantiate anything logically possible and God has omniscience, so He has the  knowledge to know how to. If this is what atheists believe? This leads to a contradiction, at least in consistency of logic. If possible worlds are actualisable, the existence of a Maximally Great Being (MGB) contains no clear contradictions, and in the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), uses possible world semantics, just like in the form the sceptic uses in suggesting her claim, that God does X (e.g. make a world where free creatures always chose the good). I will not g...

The Atheist’s Modal Dilemma : When an atheist claims that a state of affairs (e.g., a world where free creatures always choose the good) is logically possible and actualisable by an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God, they use possible world semantics identical to the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA). They face a dilemma: 1. The sceptic assumes a coherent concept of God AKA. Maximally Great Being MGB (omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) when critiquing God’s existence or actions (e.g., claiming God could actualize a world where free creatures always choose the good). The claim there is a possible world where 'X1' or 'X2' where 'X1' is free creatures always chose the good, and 'X2' is where a MGB exists, are both symmetrical in logic. 2. If the MGB’s attributes are logically coherent, then it is possible an MGB exists in some possible world. If the properties contain no explicit or hidden contradictions, like a square circle, it is a possi...