Freewill and God

Does God have freewill?

The question that sometimes gets lodged by atheists in regards to objective moral values and duties is, does God have freewill and more importantly if God can order immoral acts like rape to be moral, would we be obligated to rape and believe it to be good?

First, before we can address this issue, what do I mean by God? God as I would describe Him would be as a Maximally Great Being (MGB) which possess the following attributes or properties:

• Omnipotence: The ability to do anything logically possible. 

• Omniscience: Knowing all true facts.

• Omnibenevolence: Moral perfection or goodness to the maximal degree. 

God’s moral perfection is derived necessarily from God's Omniscience and His Omnipotence. In other words, God knows the best actions to take to achieve the best outcome in any given situation, and His Omnipotence ensures that He can bring it about without failure or limitations.

What is freewill? 

Freewill without wanting to go through a lengthy debate about differing opinions is broadly speaking the ability to do otherwise. Meaning that person P can do X but it is possible that P does ~X (not X).

What are obligations? 

An obligation is something we ought to do, in other words, it means we have a duty to do a certain task. Atheists might ground that obligation in some necessary moral fact or deontological necessity, theists will ground this in God's nature.

The problem for theists.

1. If God made it obligatory to murder or rape, are we obligated to follow this, and thus required to call it good?

2. Does God have obligations or freewill?

1. Differing Obligations objection. 

The short answer is no,  because it would contradict God’s Maximally Great Making Properties, but let me try and unpack this. 

God's properties make Him maximally great and by definition of these properties, God's nature necessarily means, His omniscience ensures He knows all true facts including moral truths, His omnipotence means he can never fail to obtain any goal in-line with those truths and thus, making Him morally perfect, as it would be contradictory for such a being to do something He knows to be wrong.

Now, have said this, this in itself doesn't ground morals necessarily in God's nature, as it is possible morals are grounded as a necessary brute fact outside of God’s nature as some atheists insist. 

What are brute facts? 

A brute fact is essentially something that just is, without further explanation, they couldn't have been any other way.

What worldview best explains objective morals?

Is Naturalism the best explanation?  

On naturalism/atheism it becomes arbitrary and inexplicable, let me try to explain why. On naturalism, what makes the moral imperatives we all share like 'murder is wrong' (or any imperative), an obligation? And why anyone is required to follow such decrees, and maybe more alarming, why these imperatives rather than something completely different? 

Another brute fact in their ontology.

Increasing the number of brute facts that are required to explain ones worldview is generally considered unhelpful to give rigorous explanatory power to ones worldview. If ones worldview requires lots of unexplained brute facts to make ones worldview work, and another has fewer and offers better explanatory scope, the one with fewer brute facts on average should be preferred. 

In short, it lacks grounding, it appears arbitrary, it lacks any real authority and it is unexpected on naturalism. 

Is theism any better?

As I've briefly stated above, God as a Maximally Great Being is necessarily existent and by necessity of His great making properties is morally perfect in line with His omnipotence and omniscience. So, automatically, the theist has a non arbitrary ground of any moral truths, it has more explanatory scope and is more expected on theism than rival hypothesis and is has at least one less brute facts included in our ontology. 

So, theism seems to be a better candidate for moral imperatives. 

A concession.

Now, having said this, it's important to recognise every worldview has brute facts, to which we reach an explanatory stopping point. Theism has a big one called "God" for which Him existence explains a long list of things. Naturalists have to have separate brute facts to explain different phenomena and laws of nature. Not being able to explain something, no finite being can be reasonably expected to know the answers to isn't necessarily a defect in their worldview, and we must all recognise that fact.

The Theistic Explanation.

So, our moral obligations and imperatives are best understood as being grounded in God making our duties rational and derived in a morally perfect God grounded in reason and his necessary nature. 

Could God make our obligations otherwise? In other words, could God make murder obligatory and we would all be required to murder each other in certain circumstances? No, as this would entail a contradiction, God could no less create a square circle than order evil to be good. God's Great Making Properties would make it metaphysically impossible to do something less than the best, which means, God could never make rape okay, and it is always wrong regardless of time, space or culture. 

What are these obligations or imperatives?

Based on careful consideration and study, I believe there are only two imperatives or duties that truly exist and from that all other moral values derive. 

1. Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. (Matt 22:37)

2. Love your neighbour as yoursel. (Matt 22:39)

If people truly did these two things, alot if not most of the evils perpetuated everyday, would stop almost immediately. 

The perceived simplicity of these imperatives is deceptive, it offeres a deep well of wisdom and explanatory power. 

If we loved everyone as ourselves, we wouldn't get jealous of someone else success and wouldn't want to steal, kill or harm them in any way.

One valid criticism that I can envision that can be lodged is that "doesn't this require an individual to self sacrifice? ", this is where i appeal to what I'd call "spheres of influence", by this I mean the duty I may have to my immediate family should rightly take precedents over that of friends, and that of the wider world.

So in Sphere 1: would be duties to God. Sphere 2: family: Sphere 3: friends and the wider community in local area. Sphere 4: the wider world.

Each Sphere of influence has different expectations and duties so as not to confuse and demand the wrong amount of attention. E.g. the duty is to provide for your loved ones, but it might be inappropriate to give all your resources to feed the poor in sphere 3 when people in sphere 2 are starving. 

In other words, the imperative to "love your neighbour as yourself" doesn't require an individual to prioritise others above oneself, or to ignore responsibilities to dependants one might have, like a spouse or children. Additionally,  it doesn't mean one should or ought, disregard ones own immediate needs over others. Fundamentally it is incumbent on one to work in the best possible job available, according to their ability and skills, provide for ones own needs i.e. food, shelter and basic needs like utilities. The reasons for this, if not immediately clear, is that if at the individual level one doesn't look after ones self, one cannot go very long before they fail physically or mentally by ignoring ones basic needs. 

For example, if one gives all their income in feeding the poor in their local community and wider world, to the total disregard to ones own needs, they can only go so long before they can't work or live without food and if they die, that individual can no longer be useful to their community, not to mention any dependants they have. 

So it seems intuitively clear, any individual is required to look after ones own needs and those of any dependants as an immediate priority and then, with what is left on ones own time or disposable income to be used to support the wider community and wider world.

What does it mean to love God? 

 By this I mean giving to God what is due to Him. God by definition is the creator of the universe and everything in it, including ourselves. This gives us a debt of gratitude especially given our fallen nature and what we actually deserve, but due to God’s love stays His hand and gives us grace to find and worship Him, who is due all praise.

2. Does God have obligations or freewill. 

On my view, God doesn’t have any obligations like we do as God’s Maximally Great Making Properties means he necessarily always does the best possible actions, so He doesn't have a obligation in the strictest possible sense of the word, in other words to do otherwise would contain a contradiction. 

Obligations imply that the ones under it can fail to achieve the greatest good, as God cannot fail to do this, God has no obligation. 

Additionally see 1 Timothy 1: 8-9a "We know that the law is good if one uses it properly. We also know that the law is made not for the righteous but for lawbreakers..." God is already fulfilling the greatest good by his own nature and so is immune from the influences of evil.

Does God have freewill? God doesn’t have the ability to do wrong, but that isn't a limitation in the negative sense of the word, it isn't a detriment to His character by lacking this ability, and if He did, he wouldn't be maximally great. So in the strictest sense of the word, God lacks freewill, but this isn’t really a negative. E.g think of a chess bot, if you put it on maximum hardness you would consider it a negative on it's abilities if the bot suddenly didn't make the objectively best move every turn it had, similarly, God suddenly doing a duff move isn't great making. 

Possible Objections:

Freewill:

Objection

Sceptics might argue that if God cannot choose otherwise, then He lacks true free will as traditionally understood. They might further claim this undermines the coherence of free will being a valuable attribute in humans. If God's inability to choose evil is not a defect, why should human freedom to choose evil be seen as a positive feature?

Response

I have gone some way in showing that God as a Maximally Great Being cannot fail to act in accordance to that nature, isn’t a defect in character,  just as much as a chess bot making the best possible move isn't a defect in its limited nature.

Humans on the other hand, aren't in the same category of being,  we are fallible and don't fully grasp or know what might be the best actions to take in any given situation. Furthermore,  for genuine love and relationship,  one must freely choose and in the case of the ultimate purpose "To love God" (Matt 22:37) this necessitates the option of not choosing such a relationship. 

Objection

Couldn't God create free agents that always choose the good, selecting people from possible worlds where they freely choose good actions?

Response

This objection misunderstands the nature of free will and the implications of finite beings. Free will entails the genuine ability to choose between alternatives. For God to create free agents who always choose the good would require removing the possibility of choosing otherwise, which would undermine true freedom.

Moreover, what a person freely chooses in one possible world does not guarantee they would make the same choices in the actual world. E.g. a person whose favorite ice cream flavour is vanilla does not necessarily choose vanilla every time they have the opportunity. Changing contexts, moods, or circumstances might lead them to choose chocolate instead. Similarly, what someone freely chooses in one situation might differ under new conditions. Circumstances, relationships, and countless variables shape decisions. So, even if someone freely chooses good in a hypothetical world, placing them in the actual world could lead to different outcomes.

Finite beings also inherently lack the qualities of omniscience and omnipotence, which means they cannot fully grasp or execute the best possible action in all circumstances. Even unintentional mistakes—due to ignorance or limitations—can lead to harm, making it impossible for finite creatures to always act morally perfect.

A sceptic might accept this explanation but then raise another question: why couldn't God create beings with maximal greatness (e.g., omnipotence and omniscience) but without necessary existence, thereby distinguishing them from God?

The idea of creating "maximally great beings" with omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection, but lacking necessary existence, is contradictory. A being that can fail to exist lacks true omnipotence, and a being without omniscience or perfect goodness cannot be morally perfect. Such a being, then, could not always choose the good and would ultimately be susceptible to failure or error.

This objection assumes a framework incompatible with free will and the nature of finite beings. God cannot create free agents who always choose the good because true freedom necessitates the possibility of choosing otherwise. Therefore, God’s creation of finite, free beings reflects the consistent and coherent nature of divine omnibenevolence, respecting the genuine freedom and limitations of creatures.

Naturalistic Grounding of Morality

Objection 

Naturalism can account for moral intuitions through evolutionary biology, societal consensus, or rational self-interest. For instance, moral norms like "murder is wrong" may arise as adaptive strategies for social cohesion rather than requiring a divine foundation.

Response

If naturalism was true, before evolution and these factors the sceptic appeals to could even start, pure chemistry and laws of physics were the cause of first life (abiogenesis). Abiogenesis has no plausible or realistic mechanism on naturalism, to date of this post, scientists haven't created a single life relevant molecule on chemistry that was on the early earth, without significant agent interference to bring it into a life friendly way! 

So I reject their assertion naturalism can be an adequate explanation! But even if i grant this is even possible, I don't,  but if I did, even then, natural selection doesn't necessarily pick for truth, false beliefs can equally bring the survival of a species! For instance, believing the tiger wants to play 'tag', and it's their time to hide, can bring about a survival advantage. Additionally, it is more plausible that our cognitive faculties aligned more closely with that of apes than our significantly higher cognitive abilities,  which are far beyond what is needed for our survival. 

Moreover, even granting all this is possible,  again! I don't, but if I did, the naturalistic explanation doesn't explain it, it creates 'just so stories' which ultimately fail and amount to subjectivism, let me explain. 

If we could play back to before we evolved from apes, it is more than plausible that our evolution could have been different to what it is today, it could be that we evolved different morals, and that it was the case rape (or what we call rape) was considered good and the females would want to be raped. If the naturalist is being consistent,  would have to admit that is a possibility and thus on naturalism, morality it isn't necessarily objective, which runs afowl of our intuitions.

Having said that, people like Rebecca Goldstein, she accepts objective morals, yet ‘grounds’ them in a ‘transcendental’ moral framework, that is to say, there are assumed and pulled up by there boot straps rather than any actual grounding per se! Rather she takes a kind of introspective approach, that takes our common shared experiences and tries to evaluate what is better. E.g. we know the pain of losing a loved one, or at least seen the effects, and this pain matters, we also know that support from friends and family help and comfort them in that pain is good for that grieving person(‘s).

More specifically in terms of evils or wrongdoings, we know the stress, pain, worry etc. when we are robbed or at least know the effects of that crime on a family member or friend. This pain matters and for advocates of this kind of view is objective proof that these wrongdoings should be condemned. In other words, these ‘matterings’ matter and give evidence and support to why these negative emotions should be avoided and laws etc. are put in place to protect the general public.

Ultimately, in my analysis,  we end with the same kind of subjectivity and had we evolved differently, they have to accept that morals could have been different.

Brute Facts in Theism vs. Naturalism

Sceptics might argue that while naturalism has multiple brute facts (e.g., moral truths, laws of physics), theism's single brute fact God encompasses an enormous amount of complexity. They might claim that positing a maximally great being is not necessarily simpler or more explanatory than naturalism's multiple brute facts.

Response 

As I've shown God, as a necessary being, provides an ultimate stopping point for explanation, whereas naturalism’s brute facts are contingent and fragmented. The simplicity of theism lies in its unified foundation, which explains morality, existence, and other phenomena coherently.

Euthyphro Dilemma

Objection 

Is something good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good?

Response 

As I have shown, morals are grounded in God's Great Making Properties which necessitates them being his intrinsic nature, so God neither arbitrarily picks what it is to be good, nor could it be otherwise, it is just his nature.  In other words, the dilemma is false and a third option is possible,  namely it is grounded in God's nature. 

Conclusion. 

I have gone some way in showing that God is the best explanation for our shared moral intuitions and naturalism is a weaker explanation comperedly. God necessarily can not act immorally and it isn't a negative on His nature that he cannot act otherwise. So, though God can't choose evil, this isn’t a defect but a great making property, as choosing the good is the best possible outcome.