Atheists Dilemma

In some debates atheists insist that God could do 'X' as it contains no logical contradiction.

If for example, the atheist insists that a world where free creatures always choose the good is possible, therefore, actualisable. The point being, the concept, contains no clear contradictions at first glance, so if God exists, He should have instantiated it in the actual world, as God by definition has omnipotence, so He has the power to instantiate anything logically possible and God has omniscience, so He has the knowledge to know how to.

If this is what atheists believe? This leads to a contradiction, at least in consistency of logic. If possible worlds are actualisable, the existence of a Maximally Great Being (MGB) contains no clear contradictions, and in the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA), uses possible world semantics, just like in the form the sceptic uses in suggesting her claim, that God does X (e.g. make a world where free creatures always chose the good). I will not go over the argument in full here, but I address the argument here and here. But the argument in essence goes like this:

1. It is possible a MGB exists (where the MGB has omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence.)

2. If it is possible a MGB exists, it exists in at least some possible worlds.

3. If a MGB exists in some possible worlds, they must exist in every possible world (if they only existed in some possible worlds, they wouldn't be maximally great unless they existed in all possible worlds.)

4. If a MGB exists in every possible world, it exists in the actual world.

5. Therefore, a MGB exists.

If the atheist is being consistent, they must conclude this is logically possible and instantiable, unless they can find a contradiction in the formulation of the MGB, but there has been no clear contradiction found:

• Omnipotence: the ability to do anything logically possible.

• Omniscience: knowing all true facts, including moral facts.

• Omnibenevolence: being perfectly good.

These properties are logically consistent and contains no clear contradiction. Unlike say a square circle or married bachelor, or the smell of blue.

The only pushback is the Reverse Modal Ontological Argument (RMOA), which shows a MGB doesn't exist, but that commits to the exact claim they must shoulder, that is, showing the MGB contains a contradiction (If they claim it is possible a MGB doesn't exist, it is logically equivalent to saying it is
impossible that a MGB exists). But there is no inherent contradiction in an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent being.

So, if they can't show it is contradictory, that is, it is like a square circle, they have to concede a MGB exists, undermining their arguments conclusion, that a God doesn't exist.

If they can show there is a contradiction, it undermines their case, as they often use an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being to critique the existence of God. In other words, they are deliberately using a faulty definition of God to show God doesn't exist making it a textbook strawman argument.

In otherwords;

(1) Claim that God's nature is logically incoherent (e.g., omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence are contradictory).

(2)  Use those same attributes to critique God's actions or the lack of evidence for His existence (e.g., the Problem of Evil or Divine Hiddenness).

If (1) succeeds (the properties are contradictory), then (2) is invalid because it critiques a being that is logically impossible and therefore irrelevant to the argument. Conversely, if (2) is valid (critiques of God's nature assume those attributes are coherent), then (1) fails because the attributes must be logically consistent for the critique to work.

In other words, The sceptic assumes the properties of God as a maximally great being is coherent enough to critique the notion of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being to begin with. But as my dilemma states, unless they can show a logical contradiction, they might be committed to the idea that a MGB is instantiable in a possible world, and if a MGB is possible in some world, it must by logical necessity, be possible in every possible world, as a maximally great being wouldn’t be maximally great if it didn’t have accessibility in all possible worlds. If they concede this point, the existence of a MGB means their conclusion a being like God, doesn’t or is unlikely to exist is undermined.

So, to avoid this, they must show it is incoherent, thus disproving God is possible, which would be a significant achievement, but undermines there case indirectly, as they were attacking a strawman version of God, that is, they attacked a weak form of theism.

Or they are forced to admit a MGB is possible, undermining their conclusion.

If the sceptic can show a clear contradiction in a MGB, the theist is forced to abandon that definition of God, possibly going to a limited God. But as no clear contradiction has been presented, my dilemma forces sceptics to grapple with the notion that critiquing God based on possible world semantics, undermines their case against God.

Therefore,  it would be my contention that sceptics abandon using the idea that God could do ‘X’ as logically possible, as this forces you to shoulder the burden of proving it is impossible a MGB exists in some possible world.