The Ontological Argument
The Ontological Argument
Originally discovered by St. Anselm, this argument has been
reformulated and defended by Alvin Plantinga, Robert Maydole, Brian Leftow, and
others.(1) Plantinga’s version is formulated in terms of possible worlds. For
those who are unfamiliar with the semantics of possible worlds, let me explain
that by “a possible world” I do not mean a planet or even a universe, but
rather a way reality might be. For example, if I say ‘the Prime Minister is a
Prime number’, is not possible, because numbers are abstract objects and cannot
possibly be identical with concrete objects like Prime Ministers in any world,
and in this case, it is absurd! Like a square circle. However, if I say Joe
Bloggs is King of England’ this could be possibly true in some possible world.
I’ll present the version of the argument as stated by Plantinga, one of its
most respected contemporary proponent God exists.
Typically, the Ontological argument isn’t well understood by
detractors of the argument. They seem to take it as a charming joke, but not
something to be taken seriously! The typical response from atheists is to think
that, we, the theist is claiming the sheer act of thinking anything you wish
and therefore it pops into existence by virtue of someone thinking of it! But
this isn’t correct, as I hope to demonstrate in my defence of the argument! The
argument, if successful, demonstrates; 1. The coherence of the notion and 2. If
it is coherent, it must exist in some possible worlds and ultimately in the
actual world.
The argument goes as follows:
1. It is possible that a
maximally great being exists.
2. If it is possible that a
maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some
possible world.
3. If a maximally great being
exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being
exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great being
exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great
being exists.
Defence of the premises:
1.
1. It is possible that a
maximally great being exists.
Is it possible that a maximally
great being exists? Now what do I mean by Maximally Great Being (MGB)? By this
I mean Omniscient, Omnipotent and Moral Perfection. It seems to me that it is
objectively better for a MGB to know all true facts, than say one that only
knows their three times table for example. Similarly, it is objectively better
for a MGB to have maximal power, than to be impotent and weak. Moreover, moral
perfection is clearly a better quality than someone who is morally suspect. Surprisingly,
premises 2-6 are relatively uncontroversial, so any objection, must be done at
premise 1, for their objection to go through, they must maintain it is logically
impossible for a MGB to exist. But I have never seen any objection that was
successful. There have been numerous attempts to give a defeater to the
argument by way of parodies E.g. A Maximally Great Island(MGI) or the Maximally
Great Pizza (MGP) or sometimes the Flying Spaghetti Monster(FSM). As
William Lane Craig puts it “...it remains the case that the concept of a
maximally great being is intuitively a coherent notion and, hence, it might be argued,
possibly instantiated. In order for the ontological argument to fail, the
concept of a maximally great being must be incoherent, like the concept of a married bachelor...once
one understands the meaning of the words “married “ and “bachelor,” that
nothing corresponding to that concept can exist” (Craig2008)
So, do these parodies work? No!
First let us look at the MGI. You should notice that in my definition of the MGB,
I used qualitative notions, that is no physical descriptors. The parodies you should recognise are
using quantitative notions, that is physical descriptions. So back to the MGI!
There are no maximal qualities to an island, they are subjective, for example,
what size should it be? You could always make it a little bit bigger to make it
greater! What about palm trees? 1,2,500? And again, you can always have more!
What about a mountain with a waterfall? Or a lake with fish, or a whole area
filled with wild berries? Maybe you hate palm trees and prefer oak trees or
something else entirely! So, as we can see the parody fails, there can be no
Maximally Great Island in all possible worlds.
But, what about the MGP? Again,
there are no obvious maximal qualities to a pizza. For example, thin crust,
thick crust, stuff crust? What about size, 10",12", bigger or smaller?
What about toppings? Moreover, whatever you pick it is subjective to the
consumer E.g. cheese, you may only like
mozzarella, or maybe you like four cheeses? What about pepperoni? Anchovies? What
if you are vegetarian or vegan? Additionally, you could always add more cheese or
pepperoni etc. to add to its greatness. Furthermore, by definition a pizza is
designed to be eaten, so couldn’t exist in all possible worlds, it is absurd
like the married bachelor.
Finally, what about the FSM? Again,
there are no clear maximal qualities to assign to the FSM. From the
Encyclopaedia Britannica they state ‘The Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM), which
is said to be invisible, is depicted as a floating mass
of spaghetti noodles with a large meatball on either side of its body
and two centrally located eyestalks.’(2) There are several problems here, 1st
Spaghetti and meatballs are created by Humans. 2nd they have a shelf life, that
is they go off and spoil. 3rd there is no maximal amount of spaghetti, why only
2 meatballs? What if you are vegan or lactose intolerant? 4th Spaghetti and
meatballs are to be eaten so couldn’t exist in every possible world. 5th Monsters
are physical flesh and blood entities.
a legendary animal combining
features of animal and human form or having the forms of various animals in
combination, as a centaur, griffin, or sphinx. any creature so ugly or
monstrous as to frighten people. any animal or human grotesquely deviating from
the normal shape, behaviour, or character. A person who excites horror by
wickedness, cruelty, etc. any animal or thing huge in size.(3) 6th If, as objectors
do say, the FSM is invisible or the Spaghetti and meatballs are special so they
do not go off or can’t be eaten, are robbing the words of any meaning, so in
essence aren’t talking about Spaghetti, meatballs or monsters! So in essence
the FSM is absurd and isn’t a good parody, it is like a married bachelor.
Another objection I have come
against, is that it is equally true it
isn’t possible a MGB exists. So they parody the argument:
1. It isn’t possible that a
maximally great being exists.
2. If it isn’t possible that a
maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some
possible world.
3. If a maximally great being doesn’t exists in some possible world, then it
exists in every possible world.
4. If a maximally great being
doesn’t exists in every possible world,
then it doesn’t exists in the actual world.
5. If a maximally great doesn’t exists
in the actual world, then a maximally great being doesn’t exists.
6. Therefore, a maximally great
being doesn’t exists.
This simply isn’t coherent, as
they are claiming it is impossible for a MGB to exists, yet when pressed cannot
say what is incoherent with the possibility of a MGB, that is, a MGB is as incoherent
as a square circle or a married bachelor. They will simply say it is just as
likely a MGB doesn’t exist. Moreover, it is incoherent to say ‘x’ exists and not
exists at the same time, either there is an incoherence to the notion of ‘x' or
not, if it isn’t incoherent, it must be
possible. Additionally, existence is better (or a great making quality) than
non existence, so the MGB being maximally great wins over non existence.
Graham Oppy, widely considered
one of the leading academic philosophic atheists in recent times, in his book ‘Arguing
about gods' discusses this argument. To me, Oppy seems to argue a weak form of
the argument, using language that both make it hard to understand and easier to
defeat. He writes “On the one hand, the idea “being than which no greater
can be conceived“ encodes the property of real existence – this is what the reductio
argument establishes (if it establishes anything at all). On the other hand, it
is perfectly possible to entertain the idea of a being than which no greater
can be conceived – and to recognise that this encodes the property of real
existence – without attributing real existence to a being than which no greater
can be conceived...”(Oppy2006) well, no, even if we take his version of
Plantinga’s Ontological Argument Oppy uses,
1.
God exists in the understanding but not in
reality.
2.
Existence in reality is greater than existence
in the understanding alone.
3.
A being having all God’s properties plus
existence in reality can be conceived.
4.
A being having all of God’s properties plus
existence in reality is greater than God. (From (1) and (2))
5.
A being greater than God can be conceived. (From
(3) and (4))
6.
It is false that a being greater than God can be
conceived.
7.
Hence, it
is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From (1), (5) and (6))
8.
God exists in the understanding.
9.
Hence God exists in reality.
The language used makes it less
understandable, but is equivalent to William
Lane Craig’s rendition. 1.we establish
it is possible that a MGB exists. 2. If it is possible a MGB exists, it must exist in some possible world. 3. A MGB
wouldn’t be maximally great if it only existed in only some possible worlds. 4.
Therefore a MGB exists in all possible worlds. 5. If a MGB exists in all
possible worlds, a MGB exists. 6. Therefore a MGB exists in the actual world.
Moreover, I do not accept his
assumption that the notion, it is possible a MGB exists encodes the property of
real existence, it is a propositional statement, so we are entertaining the
notion, if it is possible a MGB exists, then you jump to premise 2 and so on
and so forth to the conclusion. Alternatively, if it can be shown that it isn’t
possible, the argument fails. He seems to be jumping to the conclusion and
trying to sneak it into the premise to reject.
Let me be clear, I am not
accusing Oppy of bad faith, from what I have read and seen on YouTube, his
arguments are well thought through, fair and has given adequate time to discuss
topics. Given his position and education, and the response form equally well
educated people(6), it is probably me, that hasn’t understood his argument and
if my musings ever get seen by him, I would love to discuss this topic with him
some time. But as far as I can understand it, Oppy fails to give adequate force
to question the validity of the argument.
2.
2. If it is possible that a
maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some
possible world.
So if the atheist, concedes the 1st
premise, it logically follows that a MGB exists in some possible world, or they
are simply not understanding the argument. If it is possible that a MGB
exists, it must exist in some possible
world.
3.
3. If a maximally great
being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
If a MGB exists in only some
possible worlds, it isn’t maximally great, unless it exists in every possible
world, or they do not understand the argument! If a truly maximally great being
exists it cannot be limited to some possible worlds.
4.
4. If a maximally great
being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
If a MGB exists in every possible
world, it must exist in the actual world.
5.
5. If a maximally great
being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
If a MGB exists in every possible
world, then a MGB exists.
6.
6. Therefore, a maximally
great being exists.
Therefore, a MGB exists.
References
(1) Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974); Robert Maydole, “A Modal Model for Proving the Existence of God,” American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980): 135–42; Brian Leftow, “The Ontological Argument,” in The Oxford Handbook for Philosophy of Religion (ed. William J. Wainwright; Oxford University Press, 2005), 80–115.
(2) https://www.britannica.com/topic/Flying-Spaghetti-Monster
(3) https://www.dictionary.com/browse/monster
(4) Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics – William Lane Craig. 3rd ed. P 183-196
(5) Arguing About Gods – Graham Oppy. P 49-96
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