Critique of the Logical Argument from General Evil:- Benjamin Blake Speed Watkins (full)

I aim to critique Benjamin Blake Speed Watkins 'Argument from General Evil', he posts a formal argument here 

What is the Logical Problem of Evil?

The logical problem of evil argues that the existence of evil in the world is logically incompatible with the existence of a God who possesses the following attributes:

• Omnipotence: God can do anything that is logically possible.

• Omniscience: God knows everything, including all future events.

• Omnibenevolence: God is perfectly good and desires to prevent all evil unless there’s a morally sufficient reason to allow it.

The core claim is that if God has these attributes, evil should not exist. The presence of evil, therefore, seems to contradict the existence of such a God. The argument is often formalised as follows [1]:

1. God is omnipotent (able to prevent all evil).
2. God is omniscient (knows how to prevent all evil).
3. God is omnibenevolent (desires to prevent all evil).
4. Evil exists.

If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then (4) should be false—evil should not exist. Since evil does exist, the set of statements appears logically inconsistent, suggesting that God, as traditionally defined, cannot exist.

Atheologians (those who argue against the existence of God) claim that these statements lead to a contradiction. For example:

• If God is omnipotent, He could prevent all evil.

• If God is omniscient, He knows how to prevent all evil.

• If God is omnibenevolent, He would want to prevent all evil.

• Therefore, evil should not exist—but it does, so the attributes cannot all be true of God.

General Observations Regarding Evil.

There are broadly two types of evil that get discussed in the context of the Problem of Evil (PoE);

Moral Evils: that is, evil acts committed by humans, like murder, rape, stealing etc.

Natural Evils: that is, acts outside human control, like earthquakes, cancer, fires etc.

These evils vary in intensity, frequency, and distribution, raising the question: Why does God allow such a range of suffering if He could prevent it?

Ben's specific arguments structure goes something like this;

(A) There is a possible world where a perfect being such as God does not create anything at all.

(B) God has all morally relevant good-making properties and no evil-making properties.

Therefore,

(C) There is a possible world containing all morally relevant good-making properties and no evil-making properties.

(D) If some property P obtains while another property Q does not, then P does not entail Q.

Therefore,

(E) There are no evil-making properties entailed by morally relevant good-making properties.

(F) A perfect being such as God prevents all evil-making properties not entailed by morally relevant good-making properties.

Therefore,

(G) A perfect being such as God prevents all evil-making properties.

(H) We observe in the actual world some evil-making properties e.g. suffering and sin.

Therefore,

(I) There is no perfect being such as God given any evil-making property that we actually observe.

Significant Freedom

Benjamin introduces the concept of significant freedom:

• Significant freedom means creatures have the ability to make morally significant choices—choices between good and evil.

• Theists argue that significant freedom is a great good, and for it to exist, the possibility of choosing evil must also exist.

• However, the argument counters: If significant freedom allows the possibility of evil, why couldn’t God create a world where all free creatures always choose good? Such a world would preserve freedom while eliminating evil.

• Additionally, Ben highlights further by noting significant freedom is not a morally relevant good-making property because theists claim that God both lacks this property and that God's nature is no morally worse for lacking it.

Further Considerations

Before we can address Ben's argument fully, we need to address some further points and establish some preliminary ground work.

The argument will focus and rely upon possible world semantics, by “a possible world” I do not mean a planet or even a universe, but rather a way reality might be. For example, if I say ‘the Prime Minister is a Prime number’, is not possible, because numbers are abstract objects and cannot possibly be identical with concrete objects like Prime Ministers in any world, and in this case, it is absurd! Like a square circle. However, if I say Joe Bloggs is the King of England’ this could be possibly true in some possible world.

Another distinction is that of epistemic possibility and that of metaphysical possibility:

Epistemic possibility: For all I know, it could be true. Or put more simply, it is what is broadly conceivable.

Metaphysical possibility: What is actually possible.

For instance in another possible world, humans might have evolved to breathe underwater (metaphysical possibility), but I might think it’s possible to travel faster than light in 1000 years (epistemic possibility, though it might be metaphysically impossible).

In essence, epistemic possibility is about the limitations of our knowledge, while metaphysical possibility is about the fundamental nature of reality and what is possible in the abstract.


Addressing the structure of the argument:

It's worth noting, the logical structure is valid, that is, if the premises are true,  the conclusion follows necessarily, but let's take a closer look at each premise in turn.

1.There is a possible world where a perfect being such as God does not create anything at all. Is fairly uncontroversial, few would deny the universe and all the physical material therein, is contingent, that is, it could have failed to exist.

2.God has all morally relevant good-making properties and no evil-making properties. Again, this shouldn't be rejected, God as traditionally understood by theists, God is omnipotent (being able to do anything logically possible), omniscient (knowing all true facts, including moral facts) & omnibenevolent (being wholly good and perfect.). This affirms the typical understanding of God, granting that each property is great making and logically possible.

3.There is a possible world containing all morally relevant good-making properties and no evil-making properties. (From 1 & 2). It's important to recognise this is at first glance plausible, but let's take a closer look.

I would start by questioning this premise.

I question if this is just epistemically possible, rather than metaphysically possible; the point being, the premise seems to suggest that God could (metaphysical possibility) instantiate a world where there is no moral or natural evils. In otherwords, (presumably) God could pick individuals from possible worlds, where they always choose the good and export them to the actual world. 

However, this is likely impossible for a number of reasons:

1. Even if there are possible worlds where individuals always choose the good in their respective worlds, once they are in the actual world, their causal chain is altered, and different circumstances and interactions will take place.

2. Beings (like ourselves) who are finite, are prone to mistakes and fatigue,  meaning they would make inadvertent mistakes, potentially causing unintended errors and potential for unforced evils to ensue.

3. Just because a person does the good once at a given instance,  it doesn’t follow they always do the good, as each instance has innumerable different factors and variables that make every instance unique. Coupled with our finite and limited capabilities, it is impossible to ensure a limited being always does the good. I argue in "Freewill and God" that "Finite beings also inherently lack the qualities of omniscience and omnipotence, which means they cannot fully grasp or execute the best possible action in all circumstances. Even unintentional mistakes—due to ignorance or limitations—can lead to harm, making it impossible for finite creatures to always act morally perfect." Additionally, it would contain a contradiction if the interlocutor suggests God could make contingent maximally great being’s having the properties of omnipotence and omniscience, as the very definition of omnipotence would be that contingency is impossible,  as they could fail to exist and thus be limited in a substantive way. Furthermore,  it may be impossible for corporeal beings to posses omniscience, as far as we are aware, our cognitive faculties are limited to neurological and physical restraints incompatible with omnipotence and omniscience.

Moreover, as I argue in "The Problem of Evil – Why so much pain?" I briefly mention once nomological laws are instantiated,  it has necessary consequences for instance "...natural laws govern the Earth's magnetic field and plate tectonics, which enable crust recycling and the renewal of essential nutrients in the ecosystem. Processes like volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, while destructive, are byproducts of these necessary systems. Likewise, water's universal solvent properties allow it to extract nutrients from rocks and distribute them through water systems and soil, enabling the sustenance of plants and, by extension, entire ecosystems." The point being for beings like ourselves, we need certain laws and conditions that have necessary trade-offs e.g. the fire that cooks the food and warms, can also burn and kill.

In essence,  it may be impossible that natural and moral evils be eliminated, even for an omnipotent and omniscient being to remove.


4.If some property P obtains while another property Q does not, then P does not entail Q.

I take it here that P = Morally relevant good-making properties and Q = Evil making properties.

The point being, if God exists, P would be expected to be true and Q wouldn't be a possible state of affairs for such a being.

5.There are no evil-making properties entailed by morally relevant good-making properties. (From 3 & 4).

This establishes that God would only have morally relevant good-making properties. But as I've challenged Premise 3 (C), it doesn’t follow in the relevant sense that God could in principle have free creatures always doing the good or a world without natural evils.

6.A perfect being such as God prevents all evil-making properties not entailed by morally relevant good-making properties.
This would be false if God values freewill over ultimate justice and judgment straight away. If my claims in Premise 3 are correct, God can not instantiate a world with free creatures that always freely choose the good or have no natural evils, if they serve a greater good.

7.A perfect being such as God prevents all evil-making properties.(From 5 & 6).

This would be false if my claims are correct.

8.We observe in the actual world some evil-making properties e.g. suffering and sin.

This is an observed fact, natural and moral evils obviously exists.

9.There is no perfect being such as God given any evil-making property that we actually observe. (From 7 & 8).

This doesn't logically follow, as I demonstrated, freewill necessitates the possibility for moral evils and natural evils are a greater good to sustain all life.

Benjamin Blake Speed Watkins, additionally suggests that God lacking freewill seems to undermine the theists response that freewill is a necessary property to our existence, but God lacks the ability to do otherwise, which Ben argues means (freewill) isn't the greater good we initially claimed. In "Does God have freewill" I argue that just as a perfect chessbot would be maladaptive if it didn't always played the objectively the best moves possible to its disposal, God who never did the best, would equally be maladaptive if He didn't do the best too, I write "God’s moral perfection is derived necessarily from God's Omniscience and His Omnipotence. In other words, God knows the best actions to take to achieve the best outcome in any given situation, and His Omnipotence ensures that He can bring it about without failure or limitations....God as a Maximally Great Being cannot fail to act in accordance to that nature, isn’t a defect in character, just as much as a chess bot making the best possible move isn't a defect in its limited nature.

Humans on the other hand, aren't in the same category of being, we are fallible and don't fully grasp or know what might be the best actions to take in any given situation. Furthermore, for genuine love and relationship, one must freely choose and in the case of the ultimate purpose "To love God" (Matt 22:37) this necessitates the option of not choosing such a relationship."

Sub-argument: 

The Atheist’s Modal Dilemma: 

When an atheist claims that a state of affairs (e.g., a world where free creatures always choose the good) is logically possible and actualisable by an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God, they use possible world semantics identical to the Modal Ontological Argument (MOA). They face a dilemma:

1. The sceptic assumes a coherent concept of God AKA. Maximally Great Being MGB (omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent) when critiquing God’s existence or actions (e.g., claiming God could actualize a world where free creatures always choose the good).

The claim there is a possible world where 'X1' or 'X2' where 'X1' is free creatures always chose the good, and 'X2' is where a MGB exists, are both symmetrical in logic.

2. If the MGB’s attributes are logically coherent, then it is possible an MGB exists in some possible world.

If the properties contain no explicit or hidden contradictions, like a square circle, it is a possible state of affairs.

3. If an MGB exists in some possible world, it exists in all possible worlds (via the MOA, as maximal greatness entails necessary existence).

Note, that if it possible, it exists in at least some possible worlds.

4. If an MGB exists in all possible worlds, it exists in the actual world.

If a MGB exists in some possible worlds,  it wouldn't be maximally great if it didn’t exist in all possible worlds,  including the actual world.  NOTE: necessary existence isn't 'encoded' (as Oppy suggests) rather, if the sceptic can show it is incoherent, the notion never gets past the possibility premise.

5. If the MGB’s attributes are incoherent (i.e., contain a logical contradiction), then critiques assuming those attributes (e.g., Problem of Evil) are invalid, as they target a logically impossible being (a strawman).

C. The sceptic must either (1st Horn) accept the possibility of an MGB, entailing its necessary existence and undermining atheism, or (2nd Horn) demonstrate a logical contradiction in the MGB’s attributes, which invalidates their own critiques and commits them to attacking a strawman.

• Horn 1: Consistency with the MOA:

• If the atheist’s claim (e.g., a specific world is possible) is valid, then the MOA’s premise (an MGB is possible) uses the same logic: if 'X' is logically possible, it exists in some possible world.

• An MGB, by definition, exists in all possible worlds if possible in one, and thus in the actual world (per S5 modal logic).

• Accepting their own logic commits the atheist to the MGB’s existence, undermining atheism.

• Horn 2: Rejecting the MOA:

• To reject the MOA’s premise (an MGB is possible), the atheist must show that the MGB’s attributes (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence) are logically contradictory, or provide a non-arbitrary reason why their proposed state of affairs is possible while an MGB is not.

• No clear contradiction exists in the MGB’s attributes, and rejecting the MOA’s logic while accepting their own is special pleading unless justified.

• Conclusion: The atheist cannot consistently use possible world semantics to critique God (e.g., “God could actualise 'X'”) while rejecting the MOA, unless they prove the MGB’s attributes are contradictory or provide a principled distinction between their logic and the MOA’s. Without this, their position is either inconsistent or concedes the MGB’s existence.

Challenge: The atheist must either accept the MOA’s conclusion (an MGB exists) or demonstrate why their use of possible world semantics is valid while the MOA’s is fallacious, without relying on arbitrary rejection of the MOA’s conclusion.

Possible objections:

• X1 is merely contingently possible:- the symmetry isn't the same, as X2 implies necessary existence.

If the sceptic claims their claim is only contingently true, God isn’t necessarily obligated to bring it about, meaning this weakens their claim that God should do X1, as there is no obligation to bring it about? God as an MGB is necessary,  but that is only because that would be what an omnipotent and omniscient being would be like, omnipotence can't have any contingency in his main properties. However, the claim X2 is possible, could be false, if a contradiction is found, meaning both X1 and X2 are symmetrical in logical structure.

Additionally, even if we grant the contingently possible nature of X1 breaks the dilemma,  it undermines the strength of their critique, as noted before, God isn’t obligated to bring about contingent state of affairs,  moreover this breaks any logical contradiction suggested in the critique in the first place. As God could have reasons for not bringing it about if it is merely contingent.

However, this doesn't break the dilemma, if they use the definition of a MGB to critique the idea of God, it must be coherent enough to begin with, if it isn’t, their critique risks being a strawman and at best, their argument would be redundant as they could have saved time and just shown the contradiction in the first place, to undermine the whole theistic case.

• The Reverse Modal Ontological Argument (RMOA)

The sceptic could try to use the RMOA, which reverses the Modal Ontological Argument by stating a maximally great being isn't possible,  thus isn’t possible in any world. However, this is logically equivalent to saying a MGB is logically impossible, the very claim in question. Additionally, mere symmetry alone isn't enough to establish the RMOA is a possible state of affairs. For instance, the MOA gives a definition of what such a being would be like, namely omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence, these are coherent properties,  with no clear contradictions. The RMOA would need to show why these are incoherent to be a possible state of affairs.

Additionally,  if the sceptic insists the RMOA symmetry means neither the MOA or RMOA is preferred, thus the argument proves and disproves God simultaneously, presenting a contradiction. It seems it equally applies to X1, that is, we can say it isn't possible God can create free creatures that always choose the good (or whatever claim the sceptic makes) and the challenge equally disappears. 

Thus, the sceptic needs to show why X1 is a possible world and X2 isn't without ad hoc assumptions, or be forced to accept X2 is equally true as X1.

 

Conclusion.

The Problem of Evil is a powerful objection to the existence of God, but the weight of the conclusion need not trouble theists, as I have tried to demonstrate.  God has morally justifiable reasons for allowing moral and natural evils, namely free will and natural evils are required to sustain all life. This defense may not persuade sceptics,  but the sceptics cries for fowl play by God, should be equally un-persuasive to the theist.

Additionally, the atheist, must inextricably face their burden of:

1. Accept X2 is possible, undermining their conclusion that God cannot exist. 
2. Why their possibility premise is valid while dismissing the theistic possibility premise of the MOA is invalid, If they cannot show why their claim is valid and the theists is not, they must concede they are being inconsistent in logic. 
3. Shoulder the burden of proof that the concept of a MGB is incoherent, thus undermining their case, as they are using an incoherent notion of God.
4. Retreat to a lesser claim e.g an evidential argument from evil.

• Option 1, is obviously untenable for any self respecting atheist worth their salt. 
• Option 2, shouldn't be accepted lightly, as the burden is high to show why X1 is valid and X2 isn't and if they can't show why, one should try to be consistent in logic, so this seems the most costly to me. 
• Option 3, is probably the most difficult option intellectually, as a clear logical contradiction must be presented, thus triggering the strawman accusation. 
• Option 4, is the only viable option and has the least cost. But this does mean the logical problem of evil is in fact dead.

What do you choose? 

I look forward to any pushback. 

Possible objections 

1. The sceptic could insist that it is possible that God could create free creatures that always choose the good. For this objection to work, they would need to insist it is not merely epistemically possible, but that it is metaphysically possible.

• The logical problem hinges on showing that God could have created a world with no evil-making properties while preserving morally relevant goods (e.g., free will, life-sustaining laws). This requires that such a world be metaphysically possible, meaning it is consistent with the logical and metaphysical constraints of reality.

• Epistemic possibility (i.e., a world without evil is conceivable or not known to be impossible) is insufficient because it only reflects our limited knowledge or imagination. If a world without evil is merely epistemically possible, it may not be actualisable by God, as omnipotence is limited to what is logically and metaphysically possible. For example, it’s epistemically possible that 2+2=5 (we can imagine it), but it’s metaphysically impossible, so God cannot actualise it.

So, for this claim to work, the objector needs to show why, my criticisms fails show it is metaphysically impossible, my critique being:

• Even if possible worlds exist where individuals always choose the good, once they are in the actual world, causal history changes. 

• Creatures are limited and prone to fatigue and failure, meaning inadvertent mistakes happen, leading to potential for mistakes and unintended evils.

• There is no logical necessity that because a person does an action once at t=1say chooses vanilla ice cream, it doesn’t follow at t=2 or t=n they always pick vanilla, they could choose something else.

• Nomological laws, are set to allow life to flourish, e.g. the laws that enable combustion have the positive to warm, cook food and enable crust recycling, but it has the negative side effects that it can kill and destroy. 

The sceptic needs to show:

• How does God ensure consistent good choices without manipulating circumstances to the point of negating free will?

• How do finite creatures avoid mistakes or fatigue across all situations without becoming non-finite (e.g., omniscient)?

Additionally, if they insist it is metaphysically possible, they need a reason why my atheist’s dilemma doesn't apply? If it is metaphysically possible for God to do 'X', they need to show why this doesn't equally apply to the MGB in the MOA? There is no clear contradiction in the definition of a MGB.

To be logically consistent, if possibility applies here for when it suits them, it should equally apply to the MOA. To say otherwise isn’t being logically consistent or rational. 

It is important to point out, my defence has been a positive case, showing that philosophically, free creatures always have the ability to do otherwise and that laws have necessary trade-offs.

2. The objector could weaken their claim and state they meant epistemic possibility. 

This might avoid the atheist’s dilemma, but it always means if it is only epistemically possible, it isn't necessarily instantiable, thus not a possible state of affairs a possible world could be and thus not a world God could choose. 

3. A world with less suffering?

A world with one less suffering is something I address elsewhere in "Can God create a Better World?", but in short, a 'better' world, might be epistemically possible, but in practice, there is no best possible world. Some philosophers argue there is no "best possible world" because for any world God creates, a marginally better one can always be conceived (e.g., one less murder, one less instance of pain). This suggests that God is not obligated to create a "best" world, as such a concept may not exist.

4. The concept of an MGB is merely epistemically possible, not metaphysically possible. 

There are at least two reasons to question this:

1. They assumed it's coherence to critique what such a being would do, in otherwords, if the concept of God was incoherent, like a square circle, their objection should have started there, but the simple point is, no philosophically sophisticated atheist thinks the conclusion of God is incoherent. E.g. friendly atheists like Graham Oppy, Sobel, Draper. 

2. If it is merely epistemically possible, that implicitly states it is metaphysically impossible, so some hidden contradictions should be found (like I showed the concepts of limited beings always choosing the good, has contradictions)! But no clear or hidden contradiction can be found. 

So, unless it can be shown the concept of a MGB is incoherent, it remains coherent and the MOA is a viable possible way the world could be, thus it follows an MGB exists in some possible worlds, including every possible world and the actual world, as a maximally great being wouldn’t be maximally great if it only existed in some possible worlds. Thus their conclusion is undermined.

References

[1] https://iep.utm.edu/evil-log/