What the Problem of Evil Quietly Concedes

Why blaming God undermines the strongest case for atheism

The Problem of Evil is often treated as a free shot against theism.

It isn’t.

Hidden inside it is a concession—one so strong that, once noticed, the argument never looks the same again.

This post is not an argument for the existence of God. It is an internal critique of atheism’s strongest argument. The question is not whether God exists, but:

What must an atheist already assume in order to blame God at all?

Once those assumptions are made explicit, the full cost becomes clear.

1. The argument assumes better worlds are genuinely possible

When sceptics say things like:

“God could have prevented this suffering”

“God could have created a better world”

“God could have made His existence clearer”

they are not merely expressing outrage. They are making a modal claim about reality.

They are assuming that there really are possible worlds—worlds that could have existed—in which suffering is reduced.

This is not optional rhetoric. It is the engine of the argument.

If no such worlds were genuinely possible, then God could not be blamed for failing to actualise them. Moral responsibility requires alternatives. You cannot fault an agent for not doing the impossible.

So the Problem of Evil works only if this is true:

There exists at least one possible world with less suffering than ours, and God could have actualised it.

That commitment cannot be avoided without abandoning the argument.

2. Moral blame presupposes a possible God

Now notice what follows.

If God could have chosen between different possible worlds—some better, some worse—then God must be:

• Coherent.
• Capable of deliberation, and 
• Possible at least in one possible world.

Otherwise, the critique collapses.

You cannot meaningfully accuse an impossible being of moral failure. Blaming an impossible God is no different from blaming a square circle for not saving a child.

So once the sceptic says God could have done otherwise, they have already conceded something substantial:

God is at least possible.

This is not a theistic assumption. It is a consequence of the sceptic’s own argument.

3. Why this matters: modal asymmetry

This concession matters because it breaks a symmetry many atheists rely on.

Very briefly:

The Modal Ontological Argument (MOA) claims that if God is possible, then God exists.

The Reverse Modal Ontological Argument (RMOA) claims that if God is impossible, then God necessarily does not exist.

You do not need to accept either argument to see the problem.

They cannot both be strong at the same time.

Once God is admitted to be possible—even in one possible world—the RMOA collapses. Universal or necessary atheism is no longer defensible.

And the Problem of Evil forces exactly that admission.

4. The trilemma

Once this is made explicit, the sceptic faces three options.

Horn 1: Accept that God is possible

If God is possible in even one possible world, then strong atheism—the claim that God’s non-existence is necessary—is false.

At minimum, certainty disappears. The debate is no longer symmetrical. Even if the theist argument is not accepted, its reverse has been undermined.

Horn 2: Deny God’s possibility outright

The sceptic might try to say:

“Worlds with less suffering are possible if God existed, but God Himself is not possible.”

This is a very demanding position.

Since Plantinga, no logical contradiction has been shown in the concept of an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God. To deny God’s possibility while relying on His supposed powers and moral agency requires a principled explanation—and none has been convincingly supplied.

This horn requires heavy metaphysical lifting, and most arguments quietly avoid it.

Horn 3: Retreat—and accept permanent modal silence

The final option is retreat.

The sceptic can deny that:

better worlds were genuinely possible,

God had access to such worlds,

or preventability claims are well-founded.

But this move is not a temporary escape. It is a permanent constraint.

Once these modal claims are denied, the sceptic is no longer entitled to assert:

that Sue’s suffering could have been prevented,

that Bambi’s suffering could have been avoided,

that a world with less suffering was possible,

or that God could have made His existence clearer.

To assert any of these is to reintroduce exactly the assumptions that force them back into Horn 1 or Horn 2.

Horn 3 therefore imposes a modal lockdown:

The atheist must permanently abandon all “could-have-been-better” world claims—or concede God’s possibility.

And once those claims are abandoned, something else follows.

The atheist can no longer confidently say that God does not exist. At best, they can say:

God may not exist in the actual world, but

God could exist in some possible world.

This is no longer strong atheism. It is agnosticism or local atheism.

5. The real takeaway

This argument does not prove God exists.

What it shows is this:

Atheism’s strongest argument requires assumptions that, once granted, undermine atheism’s strongest denial.

Blame requires alternatives.

Alternatives require possibility.

Possibility undermines certainty.

That is the hidden cost.

6. Why this matters

The Problem of Evil is not a free shot against theism. It presupposes:

• Genuinely possible better worlds.
• A coherent God.
• Real moral agency, and
• Meaningful choice.

Once those assumptions are brought into the open, atheism is not refuted—but it is forced to retreat, either into metaphysical speculation or permanent modal silence.

And any position that can survive only by abandoning its strongest arguments deserves careful scrutiny.