Omnipotence, Omniscience and Freewill

An often used argument from some atheists, is that the typical theist understanding of God, who is omnipotent and omniscient leads to a contradiction where (according to their logic) God knows what any person will do, leading to them being determined. This is where the apparent contradiction comes, if they are determined, God is damning people to hell, for things He, appointed (determined) them to do, making God unjust, that is not omnibenevolent. 

Clarifying terms.

Before we continue, we should address what we mean by omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence and freewill. 

Omniscience: Knowing all true facts including moral truths. 

Omnipotence: The ability to do anything logically possible .

Omnibenevolence: Being morally perfect.

Freewill: Being able to do otherwise, or having significant freedom. 

Addressing the issue. 

The fact no clear contradiction has been found in philosophical thought and even philosophically sophisticated atheists like Graham Oppy do not typically use logical arguments against the existence of God, rather evidential arguments. Suggests, the popular level atheist are overstating their position. 

To be clear, atheists can pose logical arguments against God's existence, but they are notoriously difficult to substantiate as they are shouldering a heavy burden of proof, that is, they are maintaining there can be no state of affairs which a God can allow such and such, making it logically impossible for God to exist, given some known fact about the actual world. As a result, atheists typically argue evidential cases against God's existence, trying to show it is at least inconsistent with what we would expect the world to be like, if God did exist. Evidential arguments are less arduous a burden to shoulder and can pose significant problems for theists, when formulated and argued to the fullest extent possible. 

Can omniscience, omnipotence and freewill be compatible? 

If theism is true, what would it mean to say humans have freewill? Freewill, as I described it, was the ability to do otherwise, this as a broad definition, best describes what a theist means by free will. More specifically, it means we are the prime movers and first causes of our actions, by that, I mean, we are the originators of our decisions and actions. 

Omnipotence: as defined was being able to do anything logically possible, that means, God cannot bring about logically contradictory states of affairs. For instance, a rock too heavy He cannot lift it, because to do so would violate what omnipotence can do, just like it would be impossible to make a square circle, as what makes a square a square and a circle a circle, means they are mutually exclusive terms, nothing about a square or circle can co-exists in the same object.

If freewill exist, you can not force someone to freely act. For instance, if I love Jane, but Jane doesn't have feelings for me, I can not force her to love me. By logical extension to what freewill is, it requires a free act to choose. Even if I know me loving Jane is the best for her, instead of someone else, I can not force her to love me. Even if in some counter-productive case where I force her at gun point to love me, it wouldn't be a free choice, rather forced and her love wouldn't be reciprocal. 

Similarly, omnipotence can not force free creatures to do X, over ~X and for genuine free choice, it logically entails omnipotence must mean free choices are the sole responsibility of the individual. 

Omniscience: as described as knowing all true facts, including moral facts. Does it follow that person (P) does X (some deed) at time (T)=1, that they were determined to do so? No, as omnipotence can not force P to do X at T=1, it follows at T=1 P could have done ~X and God in His omniscience would have known that counterfactual. In other words, knowing P does X at T=1 doesn't mean they weren’t free to do otherwise. 

For example, if my favourite team were playing a match today, and I couldn't watch untill later tonight, and in trying to avoid hearing/reading the score on social media/radio or talking to friends, but when I heard the score discussed in passing at the photocopier. Does it follow that me knowing the score, that when watching the match on catch-up TV the players weren't free in their choices on the pitch? No, it seems completely compatible that my knowing the score, didn't invalidate their actions as free. 

Similarly, God in His Omniscience, knowing all true facts doesn't imply they are determined, it just follows, that is what happened to be, not that P □X (P necessarily does X), rather P~□X (P contingently does X), God's omniscience tracks knowledge not causation.

This, then refutes any, so called logical contradiction in omnipotence and omniscience in conjunction with freewill, as I've shown a non-arbitrary reason why it doesn't necessarily follow.

Now, what about the evidential problem?

Does it follow that God's omnibenevolence, mean God is being unjust or unfair? As I've shown there is no logical contradiction between God knowing P doing X at T=1, that it necessarily means they weren’t free in their actions. This means when P chooses ~X (an immoral act) at T=2 for instance, God isn’t to blame for the consequences of those actions. 

The question isn't then how can God judge people, or if its fair? Rather, it's how can a morally perfect and Holy God allow any evil in the first place? 

The atheist has to argue that God has no moral justification for any judgment. But on what grounds? Theist or not, would largely agree there are some moral truths, few would try to condone the actions of Jeffrey Epstein, almost universally we would deem someone like him or Jimmy Savile as evil.

But if that's true and you agree? Some things are truly wrong, meaning some actions are so bad, they demand justice, who or what delivers, said justice? The atheist might say the police and judiciary have the power to do something like that. Fair enough, but what about in the case of Epstein or Savile who never got their just deserts? In fact there are countless people who get away with the justice they deserve, either in punishment or closure. 

If you deem it immoral that God has authority to judge, again, on what grounds? Personal whim? Hatred towards God? If you agree mortal fallible judges have the power, how much more an omnibenevolent, omniscient being? 

If God is morally perfect, then no one is being unjustly punished. And again, if God is perfect, He must judge against wrong doing at the proper time. 

Why not judge evils straight away? 

The point being, why doesn't God judge the evil rapest, murders and the like straight away?

The last thing we want is justice in this life, as we would all be condemned; Matthew 5:17-48 explicitly show the impossible burden living a holy life entails. The lustful or angry thought are equivalent to adultery or murder, the implicit goal that the inward life and thoughts are as important or if not more important than outward appearances. 

So, the answer to that question is, because God might start with you. God has allowed us grace to live on this planet for a time to discover the ultimate purpose to life, that is to love God and love your neighbour as yourself (Matthew 22:34-40). And to try live this out the best we can on faith, that God will justify our actions as holy and be justified through faith.

In conclusion, therefore, I have shown there is no strict logical contradiction between freewill, omniscience and omnipotence and that they can align perfectly well within the traditional understanding of Christian theology. 

Additionally, I showed why God cannot judge evil straight away and our goal and purpose in this life to God and others.

Possible objections 

Some atheists might argue that divine foreknowledge still implies a form of determinism. If God knows at T=0 that P will do X at T=1, then P’s action seems fixed, as God’s knowledge is infallible. 

Yes, God's foreknowlege is infallible, but that doesn't follow P did X without freewill. I showed that omnipotence can't logically create free creatures to love God without violating freewill. This means logically free beings have the ability to do otherwise, therefore, creatures in the real world can do otherwise. Now, how does this pertain to omniscience? You might say by definition omniscience means such a being knows necessarily what happens at any given moment, and that would be true, at T=0 God knows what I will do at T=1, but that doesn't mean He caused it to be, He only knows what will happen, so although in the temporal sense at T=0 God knows at T=1 I will have eggs for breakfast. But in the causal sense, it doesn’t follow at T=0 God knowing at T=1 I have eggs for breakfast, He caused me to do so, in this sense God's temporal knowledge is necessary and the causal history is contingent on my freewill.  

The atheist might argue I'm quibbling over semantics, if God's omniscience means He knows at T=1 I necessarily have eggs for breakfast, then I necessarily had eggs for breakfast, it is determinism in fancy dress. 

Yes, His omniscience means He necessarily knows at T=1 I had eggs for breakfast in this hypothetical, but had I freely chosen bacon instead of eggs, God would have known that counterfactual of freedom. This is called middle knowledge, which is what my temporal necessity and causal contingency tried to elucidate, without using technical jargon that can confuse. 

In other words, I maintain that God's omniscience knows all true facts, but this temporal necessity of knowing all future events, is logically prior to the causal contingency of actions of free creatures, so if at T1 I freely choose eggs or bacon for breakfast, God will know that I chose that, while maintains my free choice. 

A more technical defence would be to employ "de dicto" and "de re" terminology in the discussion. 

• De dicto: Refers "to the statement", for instance, the proposition “God knows at T=0 that P will do X at T=1” is necessarily true because God’s omniscience entails infallible knowledge. If God knows something, it must be true (otherwise, it wouldn’t be knowledge). This is about the truth of the statement about God’s knowledge, not P’s action itself. 

• De re: Refers to "about the thing", for instance, P’s action (doing X at T=1) is not necessarily true of P as an entity. P could have done otherwise (~X), and if P had, God would have known that instead. The necessity lies in the proposition about God’s knowledge, not in P’s action being inevitable.

Which for we can describe as de dicto necessity and de re contingency. 

The atheist’s objection assumes that the de dicto necessity of God’s knowledge (“God knows P will do X” is necessarily true) implies de re necessity for P’s action (P must do X). This is the fallacy of logical determinism. Middle knowledge (God knowing what P would freely do in any scenario), shows that:

• God’s knowledge is contingent on P’s free choice. If P chooses ~X, God would know that instead.

• The necessity is in the proposition about God’s knowledge (de dicto necessity), not in P’s action itself (de re contingency).