Argument Against Bayesian Reductionism

 

1. Formal Argument Against Bayesian Reductionism

Premise 1: Bayesian reasoning holds that as the number of independent variables in a hypothesis increases, the probability of the hypothesis decreases.

Premise 2: Theistic claims about God involve multiple properties (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence) and goals (e.g., relational love, moral growth, free will).

Premise 3: Critics argue that the multiplicity of divine properties diminishes the probability of the theistic hypothesis under Bayesian logic.

Premise 4: However, divine properties are not independent variables; they are interdependent and coherent within the theistic framework.

Premise 5: Explanatory adequacy is more important than mathematical simplicity when evaluating metaphysical hypotheses, particularly when addressing complex phenomena like divine hiddenness.

Conclusion: The Bayesian critique of theism, based on the multiplicity of God’s properties, is invalid because it treats interdependent attributes as independent variables and prioritises simplicity over coherence and explanatory power.


2. Justification of Each Premise

Premise 1: Bayesian Reasoning

Bayesian logic assigns lower probabilities to hypotheses with more conditions or variables because each additional factor introduces more "requirements" to be satisfied.

This approach is useful in science where competing hypotheses often involve simple, independent variables.


Premise 2: Theistic Claims

The God of classical theism is described as having multiple properties (omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence) and goals (relational love, free will, justice). These properties and goals are part of a coherent theological framework.


Premise 3: The Bayesian Critique

Critics argue that the multiplicity of God’s properties makes the theistic hypothesis less probable because it appears to introduce unnecessary complexity.


Premise 4: Interdependence of Divine Properties

The divine attributes are not independent but are deeply interconnected:

Omnipotence ensures God can fulfill His purposes.

Omniscience ensures God knows how to achieve those purposes.

Omnibenevolence ensures those purposes are morally perfect.

Similarly, God's goals (e.g., relational love and free will) are unified under His ultimate purpose to bring about the greatest good.

Key Insight: Treating these interdependent attributes as independent variables misrepresents the theistic hypothesis. The properties of God are not an arbitrary set but a coherent whole.


Premise 5: Explanatory Adequacy Over Simplicity

Simplicity is a heuristic, not an absolute criterion for truth. A hypothesis that is overly simple may fail to account for all the data.

Theistic explanations, though complex, offer greater explanatory adequacy for phenomena like:

The existence of the universe.

The moral order.

Consciousness and free will.

The persistence of non-resistant non-belief (divine hiddenness).


3. Application to Divine Hiddenness


Critics of theism often argue that divine hiddenness is incompatible with God’s properties, particularly omnibenevolence and omnipotence. They claim this "additional complexity" lowers the probability of theism. However, this critique fails because:


Relational Coherence: God's hiddenness can be explained by His goal of fostering free, loving relationships. Overwhelming evidence might coerce belief, undermining relational authenticity.


Gradual Revelation: Hiddenness can be seen as part of God's timing and purpose in history, where revelation occurs progressively to achieve the greatest good.


Explanatory Power: The theistic explanation accounts for why some people experience hiddenness (e.g., God respects their autonomy or prepares them for future revelation) better than a purely naturalistic framework.


4. Reformulating the Critique of Bayesian Logic


A. The Interdependence Argument

1. If God exists, His properties are not independent but interdependent, forming a coherent framework.

2. Bayesian critiques treat divine properties as independent variables, artificially reducing the probability of the theistic hypothesis.

3. Therefore, Bayesian critiques misrepresent the nature of the theistic hypothesis.


B. The Adequacy Argument

1. A hypothesis’s probability should consider its ability to account for the relevant phenomena, not merely its mathematical simplicity.

2. Theism offers a coherent and adequate explanation for divine hiddenness by appealing to God’s relational and moral purposes.

3. Therefore, theistic explanations are not invalidated by their complexity but are strengthened by their explanatory power.


5. Response to Common Objections

Objection 1: More Properties Always Lower Probability

This applies to independent variables, not interdependent ones. God’s attributes are logically connected and form a unified explanatory framework.

Objection 2: Complexity Makes Theism Less Plausible

Complexity does not equal improbability. In fact, complex realities (e.g., consciousness, the fine-tuned universe) demand equally complex explanations.

Objection 3: Hiddenness Contradicts God’s Properties

Hiddenness is consistent with God’s relational goals, which prioritize love and free will over coercion. Temporary hiddenness does not undermine theism but aligns with a God who works in stages to achieve the highest good.


6. Conclusion


A formal argument against the Bayesian critique of theism demonstrates that divine properties, though numerous, are interdependent and coherent. The complexity of God’s attributes enhances the explanatory power of the theistic hypothesis, particularly concerning phenomena like divine hiddenness. Critics who rely on Bayesian logic misrepresent the nature of God and fail to account for the adequacy of the theistic explanation. Thus, the Bayesian objection to theism based on complexity is philosophically flawed.


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